The article has as point of departure the idea that for Saint Augustine biological life is intimately linked with spiritual life; moreover, biological life itself is nothing but a metaphor of the real life. It is also presented that for Saint Augustine life is ultimately a Christological matter. The basic Augustinian anthropological idea of the human being as mendicus Dei is also developed, starting from the text of 1 Cor 4, 7, and developing the image of the human being as (...) vilicus, as a simple administrator of God’s gifts. On the other hand, the issue of abortion is addressed according to the Augustinian ideas, to highlight that despite the fact that in the time of Saint Augustine a subtle distinction was made between a formed and an unformed embryo, according to the number of days of gestation, following the Aristotelian theories illuminated by the text of Ex 21, 22-23, according to the LXX, Saint Augustine opposes abortion in all cases, considering it a homicide, because whoever will become a person, is already so in the very womb of their mother. Three sources of human dignity according to Saint Augustine are also presented. In the first place, the fact that the human being has been created in the image and likeness of the Triune God. Second, the fact of Christ’s incarnation and redemption, presenting the Augustinian argument that the price of each man is none other than the blood of Christ. A third Augustinian argument is also presented, which is his condition as a son of God through the sacrament of baptism. It also presents the point of view of Saint Augustine on the death penalty, specifically in relation to the circumcelliones and the ep. 133 and the slave traders and ep. 10*. (shrink)

El artículo se ocupa de cómo interpreta Agustín el texto de Fil 1, 29 en "De praedestinatione sanctorum". Se estudia también la exégesis agustiniana de este texto en algunos sermones predicados en las fiestas de los mártires, a quienes de una manera particular se les ha concedido, como un don, no sólo creer en Cristo, sino también padecer por él.

The article considers the configuration of the ordained minister with Christ, starting first from the Old Testament figures that St. Augustine highlights as well as the theological consequences that he draws from these figures in relation to the priesthood. Subsequently, the article addresses the internal and external configuration that the ordained minister must have with Christ, the only Priest. In relation to the internal configuration, the importance of prayer and the configuration of the ordained minister with the feelings of Christ (...) are highlighted, so that he can become an instrument of God’s mercy. The configuration of the ordained minister to the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is also discussed, as well as the patience and trust that every ordained minister must have in God. The external elements of the configuration of the ordained minister to Christ are also highlighted, starting from the lifestyle of Christ, dedicated only to the proclamation of the kingdom, the importance of the mission and the joy in the exercise of the pastoral ministry. (shrink)

El artículo estudia la obra "De sancta uirginitate" desde un punto de vista eclesiológico, superando así la opinión según la cual sólo las mujeres consagradas a Dios son destinatarias de ella. Comenta también la polémica sobre la uirginitas a finales del siglo IV y principios del siglo V, y cómo presenta la virginidad el pensamiento agustiniano.

En el presente artículo se presentan los espectáculos del anfiteatro tal y como aparecen en las obras de san Agustín, poniendo de manifiesto las diversas implicaciones y significados que para él tiene el anfiteatro, particularmente lo relativo a quienes llenan esos lugares y a la valoración que le merecen a san Agustín los espectáculos ahí desarrollados. Posteriormente se habla de la figura de los gladiadores, lo que representan para san Agustín, y de la utilización catequética en sus sermones.

El presente artículo analiza sucintamente la redención como expresión de la soteriología agustiniana, formulada en cuanto descenso de Cristo hacia los hombres, tal y como este movimiento de abajamiento se retrata en diversas "Enarrationes in Psalmos", haciendo particular hincapié en las imágenes usadas por Agustín o en los misterios a los que él hace referencia, al hablar del descenso de Cristo para salvar a los hombres.

El artículo es una crónica del "colloquium" celebrado en la "Academia Belgica" de Roma, del 15 al 17 de septiembre de 2011, acerca de los sermones agustinianos "ad populum" sobre el Nuevo Testamento. El artículo hace una presentación general de cada una de las contribuciones presentadas en el "colloquium", acentuando su aportación a los estudios agustinianos.

El artículo estudia el sintagma 'membrana et atramentum' en la obra agustiniana, para descubrir, a través de una lectura conjunta del corpus agustiniano, las diversas implicaciones que este sintagma conlleva en los aspectos semántico, semiótico y teológico.

This paper begins by addressing the following question: Given the importance of the Platonism of the school of Plotinus to Augustine’s development, why didn’t he adopt apophatic theology in his early writings? That question leads to a consideration of the role of apophasis in the theology of the Roman Platonist school and in its framing of pagan monotheism. Attention then turns to the Cassiciacum treatises and their representation of interior contemplation. There we find the record of Augustine’s discovery of transcendence (...) within the interior self. But Augustine understands transcendence after his own fashion, incorporating it into his newly recovered Catholicism without entirely obscuring the outlines of Platonic transcendentalism. Thus in these early treatises the outlines of Augustine’s mature understanding of Christian contemplation can be seen already to emerge. (shrink)

El artículo estudia el influjo de Porfirio en los primeros escritos de Agustín, señalando los puntos de separación e incluso de contraposición existentes entre ambos autores. M. Cutino, al investigar este asunto, señala ya en los diálogos de Casiciaco una polémica de san Agustín contra cierto elitismo y escepticismo de fondo, propio de Porfirio y de los intelectuales seguidores suyos. El artículo retoma sólo en parte la lectura de los textos ya examinados por Cutino, para precisar mejor la naturaleza y (...) extensión del conflicto entre Porfirio y san Agustín en las obras tempranas de éste. (shrink)

In this article E. Falque offers an original reading of the Augustinian epithet “I am a weight to myself” (oneri mihi sum, conf. 10.28). The question for Falque is not to determine whether Augustine belongs to the history of metaphysics (as is J.-L. Marión’s interest), but to determine what Augustine’s “weight of life” does to phenomenology in the backlash (‘le choc en retour’), or the after theafter, of metaphysics. Specifically, foliowing M. Heidegger, Falque finds the “weight of life” particularly relevant (...) to frame the post-metaphysical experience of memory and the question of pain. Overall, the infamous Augustinian “restless heart” finquietum, conf. 1.1) ineludes, through the “weight of life”, an unquenchable dynamic which is the divine action in human beings. The “weight of life” is such in the finitude of human existence that there always remains restlessness in rest. Thus, Falque recovers the restlessness of rest through an analysis of the backlash of the “weight of life” in the after the after of metaphysics. (shrink)

It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...) of the adaptive responses is innate, the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt. The circuits subserving the adaptive responses are probably located in the limbic system. This theory of emotion is directly applicable only to a small sub-domain of the traditional realm of emotion. It can be used, however, to explain the grouping of various other phenomena under the heading of emotion, and to explain various characteristic failings of the pre-scientific conception of emotion. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis, Analysis, Volume 48, Issue 2, 1 March 1988, Pages 72–77, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/48.2.7.

Climate activists have recently engaged in widely publicized acts of politically motivated lawbreaking. This article identifies and critically analyzes two seemingly overlapping but in fact divergi...

E. J. Lowe; Are the natural numbers individuals or sorts?, Analysis, Volume 53, Issue 3, 1 July 1993, Pages 142–146, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/53.3.142.

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the BusinessEthics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers givento the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is instagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses (...) for ourstudents once they graduate to the corporate world.In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses inBusiness Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the notions of hope and how individual patient autonomy can trump carefully reasoned ethical concerns and policies intended to regulate stem cell transplants. We argue that the same limits of knowledge that inform arguments to restrain and regulate unproven treatments might also undermine our ability to comprehensively dismiss or condemn them. Incautiously or indiscriminately reasoned policies and attitudes may drive critical information and data underground, impel patients away from working with clinical researchers, and tread needlessly on hope, (...) the essential motivator of patients, advocates and researchers alike. We offer recommendations to clinicians and health care providers to help balance the discourse with individuals seeking treatment while guarding against fraud, misconception, and patient harm. (shrink)

Controversy and activism have long been linked to the subject of primate research. Even in the midst of raging ethical debates surrounding fertility treatments, genetically modified foods and stem-cell research, there has been no reduction in the campaigns of activists worldwide. Plying their trade of intimidation aimed at ending biomedical experimentation in all animals, they have succeeded in creating an environment where research institutions, often painted as guilty until proven innocent, have avoided addressing the issue for fear of becoming targets. (...) One area of intense debate is the use of primates in stroke research. Despite the fact that stroke kills more people each year than AIDS and malaria, and less than 5% of patients are candidates for current therapies, there is significant opposition to primate stroke research. A balanced examination of the ethics of primate stroke research is thus of broad interest to all areas of biomedical research. (shrink)

Clinical diagnostic medicine is an experimental science based on observation, hypothesis making, and testing. It is an use dynamic process that involves observation and summary, diagnostic conjectures, testing, review, observation and summary, new or revised conjectures, i.e. it is an iterative process. It can then be said that diagnostic hypotheses are also ‘observation-laden’. My aim is to enlarge on the strategies of medical diagnosis as these are meshed in training and clinical experience—that is, to describe the patterns of reasoning used (...) by experienced clinicians under different diagnostic circumstances and how these patterns of inquiry allow further insight into the evaluation and treatment of patients. I do not aim to present a theory and illustrate it with examples; I wish rather am to let a realistic example, similar to actual clinical scenarios, direct the exposition. To this end, I introduce an account of medical diagnosis—briefly comparing and contrasting it to other accounts—in order to focus on discussing the process of diagnosis through a detailed clinical case. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 2, Page 453-473, April 2022.

Four models of forgiveness are identified; the health model, the philosophical model, the Christian model and the prosocial model. All define the term ‘forgiveness’ in a way which is consistent with their particular perspective. The authors offer a definition of forgiveness and propose an integrated model of forgiveness which seeks to incorporate contributions from all four areas, but is not biased towards any one model. Four levels of transgression are identified and categorized according to the degree of perceived damage. Apology-automatic (...) and apology-dependent responses are distinguished from a forgiveness response which is restricted to Levels 3 and 4. The advantages of adopting a forgiveness strategy for both the forgiver and forgiven as opposed to other responses, i.e., revenge, denial, and condoning are discussed. The authors provide a definition and model which integrates the important contributions from each of the areas discussed. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Climate science denial results from ignorance and perpetuates ignorance about scientific facts and methods of inquiry. In this paper, I explore climate science denial as a type of active ignorance...

The traditional view that having a personality disorder, unlike other mental disorders, is not usually reason enough to consider a person incompetent to make healthcare decisions is challenged. The example of a case in which a woman was treated for a physical disorder without her consent illustrates that personality disorder can render a person incompetent to refuse essential treatment, particularly because it can affect the doctor–patient relationship within which consent is given.

The target articles in this special section shed new light on the old question whether and how emotions influence action. However, what is missing is a straightforward motivational analysis—considering what we have learned from the science of explaining the “why” and “how” of behavior. I posit that emotions can influence the motivation process and thus action by fulfilling at least three functions: First, being grounded in needs, experienced emotions can function as strong need-like motivational states. Second, anticipated emotions can function (...) as incentives and justify action. Third, emotions can inform about progress in goal pursuit permitting behavior calibration. In summary, there is little doubt that emotions influence action. They can do so because they are hypo-phenomena of motivation. (shrink)

It is a thankless task to have to reply to Professor Murray Krieger’s “Retrospective.” Qui s’excuse, s’accuse, and since I cannot ask my readers to embark on their own retrospective of my writings and test them for consistency, I have little chance of restoring my reputation in their eyes. Hence I would have been happier to leave Professor Krieger to his agonizing, if he did not present himself the “spokesman” for a significant body of theorists who appear to have acclaimed (...) my book on Art and Illusion without ever having read it. The followers of this school of criticism—of which Professor Krieger is a prominent member—had apparently convinced themselves that the book lent support to an aesthetics in which the notions of reality and of nature had no place. They thought that I had subverted the old idea of mimesis and that all that remained were different systems of conventional signs which were made to stand for an unknowable reality. True, professor Krieger admits that I never endorsed such an interpretation of my views, and he even concedes that there are passages in Art and Illusion which contradict such an out-and-out relativism, but he wants to convince his readers that these contradictions lead precisely to the ambiguities he now proposes to analyse.If he were right that the book encourages such a misreading, all I could do would be to express my regrets for having failed to make myself sufficiently clear. Luckily I can draw comfort from the fact that unlike these literary critics, the leading archaeologist of this country, Professor Stuart Piggott, had no difficulty at all in discerning my meaning and profiting from my arguments. In his Walter Neurath Memorial Lecture of 1978, entitled Antiquity Depicted: Aspects of Archaeological Illustration, the author did me the honour of taking a statement from my book as his starting point. It is the passage at the end of part I in which I recapitulate the content of the first two chapters:What matters to us is that the correct portrait, like the useful map, is an end product on a long road through schema and correction. It is not a faithful record of a visual experience but the faithful construction of a relational mode.Neither the subjectivity of vision nor the sway of conventions need lead us to deny that such a model can be constructed to any required degree of accuracy. What is decisive here is clearly the word “required.” The form of a representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency.1 1. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1956 , p. 90. E. H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His many influential works include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, The Sense of Order, Ideals and Idols, The Image and the Eye, and, most recently, Tributes. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Museum: Past, Present and Future and “Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye”. (shrink)

Volume 34, Issue 8, December 2020, Page 1632-1645.

ABSTRACTThe eyes are extremely important for communication. The muscles around the eyes express emotional states and the size of the pupil signals whether a person is aroused and alert or bored and fatigued. Pupil size is an overlooked social signal, yet is readily picked up by observers. Observers mirror their own pupil sizes in response, which can influence social impressions. In a landmark study by Hess [1975. The role of pupil size in communication. Scientific American, 233, 110–119] it was shown (...) that individuals with large pupils are perceived more positively than individuals with small pupils. In that behavioral study, participants were asked to draw pupils in line drawings of faces with empty irises and they drew large pupils in the happy face, and small ones in the angry face. The current study tested 579 participants and extended this work by showing that this association between large pupils and a positive impression develops over age and is absent in... (shrink)

This essay first distinguishes different questions regarding moral objectivity and relativism and then sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of these questions. First, how, if at all, can we derive, justify, or support specific moral principles and judgments from more basic moral standards and values? Second, how, if at all, can the basic standards such as my broadly Kantian perspective, be defended? Regarding the first question, the broadly Kantian position is that from ideas in Kant's later formulations of the (...) Categorical Imperative, especially human dignity and rational autonomous law-making, we can develop an appropriate moral perspective for identifying and supporting more specific principles. Both the deliberative perspective and the derivative principles can be viewed as “constructed,” but in different senses. In response to the second question, the essay examines two of Kant's strategies for defending his basic perspective and the important background of his arguments against previous moral theories. (shrink)